



Election Security: How Information (and Misinformation) Play a Role

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Executive Committee Task Force On Cybersecurity
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Introduction to CDT's Election Privacy & Security Project

About CDT

At the Center of Democracy and Technology, we believe in the power of the internet. Whether it's facilitating entrepreneurial endeavors, providing access to new markets and opportunities, or creating a platform for free speech, the internet empowers, emboldens, and equalizes people around the world.

Election Privacy & Security Project

The project addresses key election cybersecurity issues, such as election official training, technical volunteer capacity building, social media disinformation campaigns, and robust post-election auditing, by crafting resources for election officials. It is led by Maurice Turner, Deputy Director & Senior Technologist.

Priorities in 2020

Cybersecurity 101 & Risk-limiting Audit Training for Election Officials

Assess the level of cybersecurity awareness of election officials; Identify and adapt existing training materials to meet specific needs of election officials; Deliver adapted training.


Building Bridges between Election Officials, Stakeholders, Vendors, & Information Security Professionals

Assist officials in identifying civic-minded individuals or organizations (schools, associations, companies, State National Guard) with technical skills in the areas of security research and network or systems administration interested in acting as technical volunteers; Reduce tensions impeding progress on common values and issues across the community.

Modern Standards & Alternative Voting Systems

Advocate for a regulatory system that streamlines innovation allowing for rapid development by incumbents & newcomers, including the use of open-source software & commercial-off-the-shelf hardware.

Voter Confidence



Defining Misinformation

	Authenticity	Intent to Cause Harm
Mis-information	False	No
Dis-information	False	Yes
Mal-information	True	Yes

Understanding Misinformation

**AUTHENTICIT
Y**

Misinformation

Unintentional mistakes such as inaccurate photo captions, dates, statistics, translations, or when satire is taken seriously.

Disinformation

Fabricated or deliberately manipulated audio/visual content. Intentionally created conspiracy theories or rumours.

Malinformation

Deliberate publication of private information for personal or corporate gain rather than public interest, such as revenge porn. Deliberate change of context, date or time of genuine content.

Source: First Draft News

You Make The Call



**Political ads are complicated*



Examples

- Florida candidates questioned results because election night reporting **website m** (2019)
 - Misrepresenting accurate tabulation calls into question the entire election process
- **Thousands of bots** targeted Kentucky gubernatorial race (2019)
 - Account tweeting “Bye bye Bevin.” was retweeted at least 91 times before being su
bot accounts continued to tweet screenshots of the message
- Facebook announced the takedown of **50 Instagram accounts** with thousands
posting about US social and political issues and the 2020 election (2019)
 - Russian-based troll farms with links to Internet Research Agency (IRA) claimed to r
multiple politically active US communities, some based in swing states.

Evaluating Content

Reputation. Based on recognition and familiarity

Endorsement. Whether others find it credible

Consistency. Whether the message is echoed by multiple sites

Expectancy violation. Whether a website looks and behaves in an unusual manner

Self-confirmation. Whether a message confirms one's beliefs

Persuasive intent. The intent of the source in creating the message

Sources



**Foreign
Actors**



**Organized
Criminal
Groups**



Pranksters



**Political
Activists**



**Unintentional
Disruptors**

What You Can Do

- Establish yourself as an **authentic** source of information
 - Join social networks (Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat) to broadcast your message using the same communication channels
 - Transition to DMARC for email and .gov for website to prevent impersonation
- **Protect access** to your communication channels
 - Enable two-factor authentication, password managers
 - Microsoft and Google offer advanced account protection to detect attacks to email
- Develop and **practice** media responses
 - Table top exercises (TTX) use realistic scenarios to build confidence and identify gaps in procedure




Resources

- Center for Democracy & Technology [Election Privacy & Security Project](#)
- Center for Technology & Civic Life [Online Series: Cybersecurity for Election Officials](#)
- DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency [Election Security Resources](#)
- National Association of Secretaries of State [TrustedInfo2020](#)
- Harvard Shorenstein Center [Information Disorder](#)
- Unhack The Vote [Uncovering Russian Twitter Bots](#)
- Alliance for Securing Democracy [Hamilton 2.0 dashboard](#)
- Brookings Institution [Fighting deepfakes when detection fails](#)
- NATO STRATCOM COE [How Social Media Companies are Failing to Combat Information Operations](#)
[Online](#)

3 Months

Until Presidential Primary Elections



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