# Assessing Provider Consolidation and Effects on Prices

State Policy Seminar: Levers to Address Health Costs June 6, 2022



- Assessing Provider Consolidation and Effects on Prices
  - Erin Fuse Brown, JD, MPH, Georgia State University College of Law
- $\circ\,$  Give and Get Conversation
- Large Group Share Out



### Assessing Commercial Health Care Prices



- Cost growth benchmarks
- Value-based payment arrangements
- Price transparency
- Premium rate review
- Public option plans
- Consolidation oversight and provider-insurer contracting

#### HEALTH

### Addressing Commercial Health Care Prices

#### POLICY SNAPSHOT



# Assessing Provider Consolidation and Effects on Prices

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#### The New York Times

### When Hospitals Merge to Save Money, Patients Often Pay More



#### By Reed Abelson

Nov. 14, 2018

Jennifer Lamptey, a radiologic technologist, adjusting a CT scan at the Saint Raphael campus of Yale New Haven Hospital, part of a bigger system set to control a quarter of Connecticut's hospital beds. Christopher Capozziello for The New York Times

# **Consolidation drives prices higher**

- It all comes down to market power
- Market power is amassed through consolidation (horizontal mergers, vertical consolidation, joint ventures)
- Higher priced providers are not higher quality



# Health care consolidation trends

#### EXHIBIT 2



% of markets that are highly concentrated:

90% of hospital markets

65% of specialty physician markets

57% of insurer markets

39% of primary care markets

Source: Fulton, BD. Health Care Market Concentration Trends in the United States: Evidence and Policy Responses. Health Affairs. 2017;36(9):1530-1538.

# Types of consolidation

- Horizontal, vertical, crossmarket
- Buyers: other providers, payers, private equity
- Types of transactions: mergers, acquisitions, affiliation agreements, joint contracting, joint ventures

### Horizontal



### Vertical







**Cross-Market** 







# Hospital consolidation

#### A Hospital referral regions



 1,629 hospital mergers from 1993-2017

 90% of hospital markets are highly concentrated

 In most markets a single hospital controls
 >50% of market share

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of Market Concentration

Unconcentrated (HHI 100 to <1500)

Moderately concentrated (HHI 1500 to <2500)

Highly concentrated (HHI ≥2500)

Not located in any hospital referral region

# Vertical consolidation on the rise

**Exhibit 1** Percent of US physicians in practices owned by hospitals or health systems, by specialty group, 2010–18



From 2010-2018, hospital ownership of physician practices increased 89% (from 24%-46%)

Most transactions are too small to receive antitrust review

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Source: Whaley et al. Physician Compensation in Physician-owned and Hospital-Owned Practices. Health Aff. 2021;40(12)-1865-874

## Evidence of the impact of consolidation

Clear evidence that provider consolidation significantly 1 prices

- Horizontal hospital consolidation increases prices 20-60% (Cooper et al. 2020)
- Horizontal physician consolidation increases prices 8-26% (Austin & Baker 2015)
- Vertical consolidation associated with 14.1% increase in physician prices (Capps, Dranove, Ody 2019)

#### Mixed evidence on consolidation's impact on quality

- Hospital mergers did not affect patient outcomes, readmissions, or mortality, but patient satisfaction declined (Beaulieu et al. 2020)
- Hospital ownership of physician practices led to higher readmission rates and no better quality measures (McWilliams et al. 2013, Neprash et al. 2015)

### What can states do to address provider consolidation?

Policy Approach	Tools
1. Gather data	<ul> <li>All-payer claims databases</li> <li>Enhanced hospital financial reporting and hospital cost analysis</li> </ul>
2. Active state purchasing	<ul> <li>Reference-based pricing for state employee health plan</li> <li>Renegotiate/Re-procure state employee PBM contract</li> </ul>
3. Mitigate consolidation and abuses of market power	<ul> <li>Pre-transaction review and approval</li> <li>State AG action against anticompetitive conduct</li> <li>Banning anticompetitive health insurance contract terms</li> </ul>
4. Oversee health care cost growth	Health care cost growth benchmarks
5. Regulate provider rates	<ul> <li>Health insurance rate review – affordability standards</li> <li>Limit outpatient facility fees</li> <li>Public option</li> <li>Out-of-network price caps</li> <li>All-payer model, global hospital budgets</li> </ul>

Pretransaction notice, review, approval **Authority granted:** Require prior notice, review, approval of health care transactions by State Attorney General and/or health agency. Review should include impact on competition, costs, access, public interest. Authorize conditional approvals, consent decrees, and post-transaction oversight.

**Scope:** Can apply to a range of provider types (including physicians), purchasers (including private equity), nonprofit and for-profit, and transactions (change of control, other material changes).

Can include smaller transactions that "fly under the radar" below Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting threshold (\$101 million in 2022).

#### **Examples:**

- Oregon <u>HB 2362 (2021)</u> enacted
- California AB 2080 (2022) passed Assembly, moved to Senate
- MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6D § 13
- <u>CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-639f</u>

#### **Resources:**

- NASHP <u>model law</u> and <u>policy brief</u> on health care transaction review and approval
- Montague, Gudiksen, King, "<u>State Action to Oversee Consolidation of Health</u> <u>Care Providers</u>," Milbank Issue Brief (2021)

Ban anticompetitive health plan contract terms **Authority granted:** Legislatively ban use of anticompetitive health plan contracting terms. Makes the use of these terms presumptively unlawful under state consumer protection and antitrust laws.

**Anticompetitive terms:** All-or-nothing contracting; Anti-tiering or antisteering clauses; gag clauses; most-favored nation clauses; exclusive contracting.

**Examples:** 

- Nevada <u>SB 329 (</u>2021) enacted
- Indiana <u>HB 1117 (2022)</u> introduced
- California <u>AB 2080 (2022)</u> passed Assembly, moved to Senate

**Resources:** 

- <u>NASHP Model law</u> and <u>policy brief</u> to prohibit anticompetitive health plan contracting
- Gudiksen, Montague, King, "<u>Mitigating the Price Impacts of Health Care</u> Provider Consolidation," Milbank Issue Brief (2021)

### Attorney General Action: Challenging Anticompetitive Conduct

- State AG uses parallel antitrust enforcement authority to challenge anticompetitive conduct (e.g., all-or-nothing contracts, MFNs, anti-steering, raising prices)
- Resource-intensive, would be supported by legislation making anticompetitive contract terms presumptively unlawful
- Examples:
  - Becerra v. Sutter Health (CA)
  - United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. (Atrium case) (NC)
  - State of Washington v. Franciscan Health System (WA)

# Thank you!

## Erin C. Fuse Brown, JD, MPH











- In groups of **2-3 people...**
- Give: Share a strategy your state has pursued, or something you are considering doing, related to provider consolidation and health care prices.
  - E.g., Indiana established a legislative committee to study health care market concentration.
- Get: Ask a question or seek advice over some aspect of provider consolidation and health care prices.
  - E.g., What state agencies or industry stakeholders should I collaborate with on this topic?



### Give and Get Conversation



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### **NCSL Resources**

- <u>Health Costs, Coverage and Delivery State</u> <u>Legislation</u>
- <u>Assessing Commercial Health Care Prices</u> (June 2022)
- <u>Health Care Costs 101: What's a State to Do? (May</u> 2022)